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Abstract 
CONTRACTUAL METHODS OF INCENTIVIZING IMPROVED 
SPACE FLIGHT SAFETY 
James R. Vickers 
Head Contracts 
Missile Systems Group 
Hughes Aircraft Company 
Canoga Park, California 
The contractual methods NASA uses to assure safety for manned spaced flights 
are examined in this paper. It concludes that they do little to incentivize 
a contractor to improve safety and suggests that in areas as critical as 
manned space flight safety, NASA adopt a Safety Engineering Incentive 
Program. This program would be similar to the existing Value Engineering 
program except that financial incentives would be paid for improving safety. 
The paper also suggests that as an added incentive for improving safety, 
relief from liability under Public Law 85-804 on future projects be 
conditioned by limiting it to risks that the contractor disclosed to NASA or 
risks that he could not have known. 
Manned space flight, because of its costs and concern for the safety of the 
crew, requires extraordinary measures to assure its success. Anything that 
can be done to increase the safety of the mission, and thereby its chances 
of success, must be considered. Ordinary contracting methods may not do 
enough to help achieve the objective of obtaining the highest obtainable 
safety for manned space flight. This paper suggests some extraordinary 
contracting methods that may incentivize contractors to become more involved 
in the quest for greater safety of manned space flight. 
Contractor incentives can be divided into two types: positive incentives and 
negative incentives or the proverbial "carrot and the stick." The 
contractor's organizational structure is often determinant of which type of 
incentive he reacts to best. However, a combination of both positive and 
negative incentives should elicit the desired response from most contractors 
regardless of their organizational structure. 
Existing Contracting Methods 
NASA, as well as other government agencies, typically attempt to assure the 
safety of a system by specifying it either in the solicitation and/or as 
part of a Systems Safety Plan. NASA's Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 
paragraph 18-23.7002 requires originators of procurement requests to ensure 
that procurement requests are processed through the appropriate installatio~ 
safety officials for (1) determination if hazards are involved in the 
procurement, (2) formulating or selecting specific safety provisions 
applicable to the procurement, and determining to what extent a contractor 
safety or health plan will be involved. This approach normally results in 
the best Government and contractor safety experts being involved at the 
earliest stages of the program. The net results of their efforts is a 
system safety plan and/or specifications for the program. 
The safety plan or requirements that evolve from this process may very well 
be the best available at the inception of the program. These safety plans 
may typically call for periodic safety reviews during the life of the 
program. However, once the safety plan has been agreed upon by the parties, 
these reviews tend to only measure performance against the plan. But as a 
contractor's design stabilizes, his interests are going to lean more toward 
justifying that his design meets the requirements of the safety plan or 
specifications and he will have little incentive to offer a design change 
that will improve the safety of the system. 
Recognizing that contractors may be able to improve system safety during the 
life of a program, beyond what was initially specified, a special contract 
clause is used on Space Shuttle Contracts and sub-contracts. This clause, 
entitled "Manned Space Flight Requirements"· requires the contractor to 
"advise the purchaser, notwithstanding cost, if he is able to supply the 
desired item with a quality which is higher than specified ... " While this 
clause is definitely a step in the right direction, it falls short of 
achieving the objective of assuring that the purchaser is informed of any 
potential ways to make the system safer. The clause has two shortcomings. 
First, it equates higher quality with improved safety. The two may not be 
that complementary, i.e. a change may improve the system safety but not the 
quality or vice-versa. The second, and major short fall, is that the clause 
does not give the contractor any incentive to find a way to improve the 
safety of his product. He could be fully compliant with the clause by 
merely advising the purchaser of any potential-quality or safety 
improvement. He would not have to seek out such improvements and, if his 
design were reasonably secure, he would not have any incentive to be an 
advocate of any change that improves safety. 
Value Engineering 
One of the most effective ways the Department of Defense motivates 
contractors to seek ways to improve existing contract specification is 
through Value Engineering. Under the terms of a Value Engineering clause, a 
contractor is incentivized to look for more cost effective ways to make his 
product, or perform a service, without altering the critical performance 
characteristics of the product or service.. If the contractor finds a better 
way of performing his task, and if it requires a change to the contract to 
implement it, he prepares a Value Engineering Change Proposal (VECP). If 
the contracting officer accepts the proposal, the contractor receives a 
significant share of the savings (on fixed price contracts it is 50 percent 
of the savings occurring over a three year period). 
The Department of Defense has had remarkable success with Value Engineering. 
The contractor's interest in Value Engineering is one of the main reasons 
for this success. The Contractors were quick to recognize the potential for 
increased profits because of the generous sharing provisions in the Value 
Engineering clauses. The Government, in addition to recognizing its share 
of the saving, also realized that many contract specifications and other 
requirements could be improved upon. This is particularly true if one takes 
into consideration the new technologies that may have evolved since the 
inception of the original contract requirements. Furthermore, the 
Government recognized that the contractor is often in the best position for 
finding ways to improve contract specifications and requirements because he 
is closer to the work and has a financial incentive. 
The same principles that motivate a contractor to propose changes to 
contract specifications in order to reduce cost can also be used to motivate 
9-9 
him to propose changes that will improve safety. There are two precepts of 
the existing contractual Value Engineering program that makes it attractive 
to the contractor. The first is the definitive and substantial financial 
award that comes from an accepted VECP. The second is assurance that the 
contractor is not going to be penalized for not already having his proposed 
change as part of his current design or baseline. 
In order to capitalize on the potential contractor initiate to improve 
system safety, NASA should consider developing a new contract provision for 
inclusion in its contracts involving manned space flight. The clause could 
be entitled "Safety Engineering Incentive Program". Its goal would be to 
offer contractors financial incentives to improve the safety of the product 
or service being delivered. Determining the amount of financial reward to 
provide a contractor under a Safety Engineering program will be difficult 
because changes to increase system safety will rarely result in any costs 
saving to be shared as is the case in Value Engineering. However, in 
keeping with the goals of making the reward definitive and substantial 
enough to be motivating, various options are available. 
The typical contract change involves deleting some effort and adding new 
effort. On a change under the Changes Clause (FAR 52.243-1) when effort is 
reduced, profit is reduced proportionately. When a change is accomplished 
under the Value Engineering clause, profit is not changed. It is suggested 
that for safety enhancing changes submitted under the Safety Engineering 
Clause, the contractor be allowed to keep his originally negotiated profit 
regardless of the fact that some work will be deleted. On work added, the 
NASA Structure Approach for Profit Fee Objective (NASA Form 634) could be 
adjusted to add an additional five (5) percent profit under the existing 
"special situations" factor (Block 2). This profit would be in addition to 
the profit the contractor would normally be entitled to under the Structured 
Approach. The following is an example of how this procedure would work. 
Cost 
Profit 
SAFETY ENGINEERING CHANGE 
Basic Contract Price 
Cost 
Profit 10% 
Changed Work 
Work Deleted 
100,000 
(100,000) 
1,100,000 
1,000,000 
100,000 
Work Added 
200,000 
30,000 (10% + 5%) 
230,000 
Total increase in contract price ($230K-100K) = 130,000 
Actual profit on $200,000 of new effort = 30,000 new profit + 10,000 profit 
on work deleted = 40,000 or 20% 
New contract price - 1,230,000 
1,100,000 - 100,000 + 230,000 
~10 
Normal Change Clause Change 
Work Deleted 
Cost $100,000 
Profit. 10, 000 
($110,000) 
Work Added 
$200,000 
20,000 (10%) 
$220,000 
New Contract Price $1,210,000 
(1,100,000 - 110,000 + 220,000) 
From the above example one can see that while the difference in total 
contract price is not that much different between a typical Change Clause 
change and a change under the Safety Engineering Clause, the difference in 
profit is great. In this example it is 20 percent or twice his normal 
profit. This profit would even be greater if the costs of the work deleted 
was equal to or greater than the cost of the work added. 
The reader may have some concern that the profits that a contractor may make 
under this approach exceed the limits of 10 USC 2306(d) which limits fixed 
fee payments on cost contracts to 10 percent of the estimated cost for 
production contracts and 15 percent for research and development contracts. 
However, the proposed additional financial incentives, although treated as 
profit by the contractor, are probably more in the nature of .incentive 
payments. The Armed Services Board of Contracts appeals has held, and the 
FAR (FAR 48.102 (d)) has recognized that Value Engineering incentive 
payments do not constitute profit or fee within the limitations imposed by 
10 USC 2306(d) and 41 USC 254(b). The same should be true for incentive 
payments under a Safety Engineering incentive program. 
Contractors In Loss Position 
Notwithstanding the financial rewards for an accepted Safety Engineering 
proposal, there may be some reluctance for a contractor to submit a Safety 
Engineering proposal if he is in a loss position on the work he would 
propose changing. He may not want to recognize the loss immediately or he 
may be concerned with the loss adjustment rules which require you to delete 
effort at the current cost of performance even if it is greater than the 
contract amount. On significant changes that could involve a major safety 
concern, the Administrator of NASA may waive the loss adjustment rule under 
the authority of Public Law 85-804. Such relief would be at the discretion 
of the Government and would be granted only under unusual circumstances 
where there is a serious safety concern and/or significant opportunity to 
improve system safety. The Government's willingness to consider such 
relief, in the event the circumstances warrant it, could be conveyed to the 
contractor in a brief clause similar to (or perhaps as an addition to) the 
Manned Space Flight Requirements clause. In this clause the Government 
would reiterate its concern for manned space flight safety and that, 
notwithstanding cost, if a major change were required or possible to 
significantly improve flight safety it should be proposed and, if necessary, 
the Government will consider restructuring the contract to incorporate the 
change regardless of financial consideration, under the authority of Public 
Law 85-804 
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Safety Engineering Program Requirements Clause 
The Safety Engineering Incentive Program described above relies on the 
contractor's initiative for submission of safety enhancing change proposals. 
There is no requirement that he submit them. Where the government believes 
there are areas in a system or design which have the potential for improving 
safety or are so critical that they need further examination, the Government 
could include a Safety Engineering Program Requirements Clause. This claupe 
would be similar to the Value Engineering program requirements clause (DAR 
7-104.44 Alternative I). Under this clause, the contractor would be 
required to conduct studies and analysis into certain pre-designed areas of 
his design or services and to provide proposals (if possible) for improving 
the safety in these designated areas. He would be paid for this effort 
under a separate line item of his contract and would submit the required 
proposals and/or reports under a separate item involved on the Contract Data 
Requirement (CDRL). Since the Government is paying the contractor for this 
effort, the rewards for his submitting a successful Safety Engineering 
Proposal need not be as great as under the Safety Engineering Incentive 
Programs. The incentive rewards for submissions under the Value Engineering 
Program Clause are approximately half those provided for under the Value 
Engineering Incentive Clause. (Dar 7-104.44(f)(l)) The same proportion 
should be appropriate with Safety Engineering incentives. 
In some situations the Government might want to include both Incentive 
Clauses and Program Requirements clauses. A typical example would be where 
the Government wants to incentivize the contract or in general to look for 
ways of improving flight safety and also has some specific areas that it 
wants the contractor to look into in depth. These clauses are 
complementary. However, on proposals submitted on items or areas identified 
under the Program Requirements Clause, the lower incentive reward 
percentages would apply. Value Engineering allows for both types of clauses 
being available on the same contract under Alternative II of DAR 7-104.44. 
Contents Of Safety Engineering Proposal 
The Safety Engineering Incentive and Program Clauses should set forth the 
required contents of a Safety Engineering Change Proposal. As a minimum the 
proposal should include the information the Government needs to evaluate the 
desirability of the changes. This should include the following 
requirements: 
A. A statement identifying the change as a safety change being 
submitted under the Safety Engineering Clause. 
B. A cost computation including the cost to be added and deleted. 
(Because of the urgency of safety issues, preliminary cost 
estimates or not-to-exceed pricing may be acceptable.) 
C. The impact the change will have on the contract schedule. 
D. The recommended time to implement the change (when the change 
could be implemented most efficiently). 
E. Some quantitative estimate of the improved safety resulting from 
the change. The method of quantification such as reduced 
probability of failure should be flexible, but the method of 
quantification should be explained. 
The exact language of a Safety Engineering Incentive Clause, including the 
appropriate profit percentage or other incentives will probably develop over 
time through trial and error. The clause should be modified as more is 
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learned about contractors reaction to incentives and to account for problems 
in the administration of the program. This should be expected. From the 
time of the first DOD Value Engineering clause in 1959 until 1974, when the 
Value Engineering program evolved to essentially what it is today, the Value 
Engineering Clause has gone through some twenty changes. Hopefully, Safety 
Engineering can learn from the experience of Value Engineering and not need 
as many changes. 
It is recommended that NASA consider using a Safety Engineering Incentive 
Program on a trial basis on any future contracts involving manned space 
flight where this is above normal concern for safety. The results of it 
could be carefully monitored with the objective of using it on all contracts 
involving manned space flight if it proves satisfactory. 
One thing that should be considered in administering a Safety Engineering 
Incentive program is providing the contractor assurance that he will not be 
penalized for submitting a Safety Engineering Change Proposal. If the 
Contracting Officer unjustifiable takes the position that a contractor's 
proposed change is within the scope of his current contract or should be 
part of his baseline design, the contractor will have no incentive to submit 
a Safety Engineering Proposal. This has been a major problem with Value 
Engineering proposals at some procurement offices. Contractors soon learn 
when a procurement off ice is not receptive to Value Engineering and soon 
stop submitting proposals. When this happens both parties lose. 
Failure to accept a Safety Engineering Change Proposal because it is within 
the scope of the contract could be an even greater problem for NASA because 
many safety improving changes could be accomplished without a change in the 
contract. (In contrast Value Engineering Change Proposals, by definition, 
require a change in the contract.) NASA can overcome this potential problem 
by careful administration of the Safety Engineering program and establishing 
a policy of encouraging Safety Engineering and rewarding contractors for 
submittal of Safety Engineering proposals. If a Safety Engineering program 
is administered by NASA with the same commitment that it has shown to its 
New Technology Program, it is sure to be a success. 
Public Law 85-804 
The aforementioned incentives were all positive, i.e. they reward a 
contractor for proposing ways to improva safety. Not every contractor or 
every part of his organization will be motivated by these incentives. Some 
contractors may need a stick to get them to advise NASA of any potential 
safety hazards. NASA has this stick in the relief from liability under 
Public Law 85-804. 
In 1983 NASA announced that due to the dangerous nature of space flights it 
would, within certain limitations, identify contractors (and subcontractors) 
for liability on products or services they performed in support of the Space 
Transportation System ... This indemnity was formalized in NASA FAR 
Supplement 18-52.250-70 (October 1984) and 18-52.250-71 (October 1984). As 
the Administrator of NASA determined when he granted this relief, manned 
space flight is dangerous and accordingly the risks involved can not be 
insured against at reasonable prices. What is surprising is that this 
decision was not made until ten years after the contract for the design of 
the shuttle was awarded. Consequently, this relief could do little to help 
improve the safety of shuttle design (it did help enable several contractors 
to begin or continue working on shuttle repair or maintenance contracts who 
could or would not be able to perform due to the cost or unavailability of 
liability insurance). · 
The indemnification protection available under Public Law 85-804 could be 
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used to incentivize contractors if not to improve, to at least disclose 
potential safety problems with their product or service. This could be 
accomplished by conditioning relief from liability to only those potential 
risks which the contractor disclosed in writing to the Government unless the 
risk could not be discovered by the contractor with due diligence. If this 
was made clear at the inception of a program, contractors would have the 
incentive to report at the outset of the contract and throughout the life of 
the contract in order to be assured they would be relieved from any 
potential liability. The interesting thing about this incentive is that it 
will get the attention of the contractor's lawyers and accountants, who may 
not be involved in a Safety Engineering Incentive Program. They would be 
interested in assuring compliance with this disclosure requirement 'because 
they would want to protect their firm from potential liabilities. 
Conclusion 
As stated in this paper, there are contractual means to incentivize a 
contractor to improve safety. However, there are extraordinary means that 
should only, at least for the present, be employed in the pursuit of 
something as important as improving the safety of manned space flight. 
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